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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
JOHN R. GIBSON, Circuit Judge: 
 
Fernando and Maria Pinho petition for r eview from an 
adverse ruling by the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Board). The Board dismissed the Pinhos' appeal from an 
immigration judge decision denying suspension of 
deportation. The Pinhos contend that they satisfied the 
eligibility requirements for suspension of deportation at the 
time they filed their application and at the time the judge 
heard their case; that due to a long delay in their appeals 
process, which was beyond their control, they were unfairly 
held to a retroactive application of an amendment to 
section 240A(d) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 
U.S.C. S 1229b(d) (Supp. IV 1998); and that the current 
immigration law confers benefits on certain classes of aliens 
in violation of the equal protection component of the Fifth 
Amendment's Due Process Clause. We affirm. 
 
I. 
 
In August 1984, the Pinhos came to the United States 
from Portugal with their three childr en as non-immigrant 
visitors and remained until December 1990. At that time, 
they returned to Portugal for not mor e than three weeks, 
where they sought unsuccessfully to obtain immigrant 
visas. Upon their return to the United States in January 
1991, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) 
served the Pinhos with orders to show cause why they 
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should not be deported for having entered the United States 
without inspection, thereby instituting deportation 
proceedings against them. At the time the or ders to show 
cause were served, the Pinhos did not have seven years of 
continuous physical presence in the United States. 
However, they had been continuously physically present in 
the United States for more than seven years when their 
case was heard on January 6, 1992. 
 
Mr. Pinho continues to operate a concr ete business he 
established in 1986 and employs others in his community. 
The Pinhos have strong ties to their community. Their 
children were educated here, and they own real estate in 
this country. 
 
On January 6, 1992, the Pinhos appeared befor e the 
judge, conceded deportability, and applied for suspension of 
deportation under section 244(a)(1) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. S 1254(a)(1) (1994) (repealed by the 
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility 
Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, S 309, 110 Stat. 3009-615 
(1996)), or, in the alternative, for voluntary departure. 
Immigration and Nationality Act S 244(a)(1), as it existed at 
the time, authorized the discretionary r elief of suspension 
of deportation if the immigrant met three criteria: seven 
years continuous physical presence in the United States, 
good moral character, and extreme har dship. The 
immigration judge denied their application for suspension 
of deportation based solely on his finding that deportation 
would not cause extreme hardship. The judge specifically 
stated that the Pinhos had lived in the United States for 
more than seven years, thus satisfying the continuous 
physical presence requirement as it then existed. Without 
specifically ruling on the issue of good moral character, the 
judge found no evidence that the Pinhos failed to meet this 
requirement. The judge granted the application for 
voluntary departure and ordered that the Pinhos be 
deported if they did not voluntarily depart the United States 
within the time allowed. 
 
The Pinhos appealed the denial to the Board, which took 
no action on the appeal and had no communication with 
the Pinhos for the next six years. In March 1998, the Board 
requested supplemental briefing to addr ess changes in the 
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immigration laws that occurred while the Pinhos' appeal 
was pending. The Pinhos submitted their supplemental 
brief in April 1998. 
 
On September 14, 1999, the Board dismissed their 
appeal, applying the new stop-time rule of section 240A(d) 
of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.S 1229b(d) 
(Supp. IV 1998), which was enacted after the judge's 
decision. The Board concluded that the newly enacted law 
provided the eligibility criteria to be applied to the Pinhos' 
application for suspension of deportation. This petition for 
review followed. 
 
II. 
 
We review only the decision of the Boar d, and not the 
immigration judge's ruling. See Green v. INS, 46 F.3d 313, 
320 (3d Cir. 1995). The only question befor e us is whether 
the Board properly applied the new continuous physical 
presence requirement (the stop-time rule) to the Pinhos' 
pending deportation proceedings. We conclude that it did. 
 
Before the enactment of the Illegal Immigration Reform 
and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (often r eferred to 
as IIRIRA, but we believe clarity is served by r eferring to it 
in this opinion as the Reform and Responsibility Act), 
suspension of deportation was a form of discr etionary relief 
available to aliens who had been determined to be 
deportable and who met certain statutory criteria. See 8 
U.S.C. S 1254 (1994) (repealed 1996). The general 
requirements were continuous physical presence in the 
United States for seven years, good moral character , and 
extreme hardship. Id. After the alien had established these 
elements, the Attorney General had discr etion to grant or 
deny the relief. Id. 
 
The Reform and Responsibility Act, which over hauled the 
process of excluding or removing aliens fr om the United 
States, abolished suspension of deportation. Pending 
deportation proceedings were generally excluded from the 
Act's changes, see Reform and Responsibility Act 
S 309(c)(1). However, certain pr ovisions were made 
applicable to all pending and new cases.1  One of those 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Congress set out transitional rules to specify how the Reform and 
Responsibility Act was to apply to cases pending on that Act's effective 
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provisions is the stop-time rule of section 309(c)(5) (codified 
at 8 U.S.C. S 1229b(d) (Supp. IV 1998)), which changed how 
the continuous physical presence test was calculated. The 
old rule provided that the seven-year period was counted 
from the date the alien entered the United States until the 
date of application for suspension of deportation. 8 U.S.C. 
S 1254(a)(1) (1994) (repealed 1996). The new stop-time rule 
stops the counting period on the date the alien is served 
with an order to show cause why he or she should not be 
deported. Reform and Responsibility Act S 309(c)(5); 8 
U.S.C. S 1229b(d)(1) (Supp. IV 1998). 
 
Uncertainty existed in the interpretation of Reform and 
Responsibility Act S 309(c)(5) because it stated that the new 
stop-time rule applied to "notices to appear issued before, 
on, or after" enactment of the Reform and Responsibility Act.2 
This language created ambiguity as to whether pending 
deportation proceedings were actually covered because all 
deportation cases were initiated with an or der to show 
cause and not a notice to appear. In Matter of N-J-B-, 
Interim Decision 3309 (B.I.A. 1997), the Boar d examined 
section 309(c)(5) and held that the stop-time rule applied to 
applications for suspension of deportation pending on the 
effective date of the Reform and Responsibility Act.3 The 
Attorney General vacated that decision and certified the 
question to herself for review. The question was settled 
when Congress passed the Nicaraguan Adjustment and 
Central American Relief Act of 1997 (NACARA), Pub. L. No. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
date. See 8 U.S.C. S 1101 note "Ef fective Date of 1996 Amendments" 
(Supp. IV 1998). 
 
2. Pre-Reform and Responsibility Act charging documents that began 
deportation proceedings were known as Or ders to Show Cause. As part 
of the change in the overall scheme of immigration law, Congress 
changed the name of the charging document and the government actions 
vis a vis immigrants. The charging documents are now called Notices to 
Appear, and deportation is now called r emoval. 8 U.S.C. SS 1229 (Supp. 
IV 1998). 
 
3. The Board came to that conclusion by interpreting the phrase to refer 
generally to charging documents initiating pr oceedings in the nature of 
deportation or removal, and not exclusively to the documents entitled 
"Notice to Appear." 
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105-100, 111 Stat. 2160 (1997).4 Following enactment of 
NACARA, the Board again was presented with the same 
question and upheld its earlier interpretation of section 
309(c)(5), concluding that NACARA clarified that the 
Board's holding that the stop-time rule applied to orders to 
show cause in Matter of N-J-B- was corr ect. In re Nolasco- 
Tofino, Interim Decision 3385 (B.I.A. 1999); see also Rivera- 
Jimenez v. INS, 214 F.3d 1213, 1217 (10th Cir. 2000). 
 
Both the plain language of NACARA and Board pr ecedent 
state that the stop-time rule applies to suspension of 
deportation cases. The Pinhos challenge on two bases the 
constitutionality of this law as applied to them. First, they 
argue that the retroactive application of the stop-time rule 
denies them procedural due process in violation of the Fifth 
Amendment. Second, they argue that the exceptions for 
certain classes of aliens violate the equal pr otection 
principles of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. 
 
A. 
 
The question of whether to accord retr oactive effect to a 
statute is determined by the Supreme Court's rule in 
Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 280 (1994). 
The multi-part analysis begins with determining whether 
Congress has expressly addressed whether the statute is to 
apply to pending cases or only to new cases initiated after 
the statute is enacted. See id. Since the transitional rule 
with regard to suspension of deportation, Reform and 
Responsibility Act S 309(c)(5), 8 U.S.C. S 1101 note (Supp. 
IV 1998), itself states when it is to take ef fect and what 
cases are covered by it, there is no need to resort to the 
presumption against retroactivity. Id. Cf. Idahoan Fresh v. 
Advantage Produce, Inc., 157 F.3d 197, 202 (3d Cir. 1998) 
(clear and unambiguous plain language of a statute 
obviates need for further inquiry). 
 
Section 309(c)(5) of the Reform and Responsibility Act, as 
modified by section 203(a)(1) of NACARA (T ransitional Rules 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Section 203(a)(1) of NACARA amended Refor m and Responsibility Act 
S 309(c)(5) by replacing the term"notices to appear" with the term 
"orders to show cause." See infra at 8. 
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With Regard To Suspension Of Deportation), states in 
relevant part that "section 240A(d) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (relating to continuous r esidence or physical 
presence) [the stop-time rule] shall apply to orders to show 
cause . . . issued before, on, or after the date of the 
enactment of this Act." The Reform and Responsibility Act 
was enacted September 30, 1996 and took effect April 1, 
1997. NACARA's amendments to it were ef fective "as if 
included in the enactment of [the Reform and 
Responsibility Act]." NACARA S 203(f); 8 U.S.C. S 1101 note 
(Supp. IV 1998). The plain meaning of these statutes 
establishes Congress's intent to apply the stop-time rule to 
all cases, including those pending as of September 30, 
1996. NACARA S 203(f). 
 
The Pinhos' orders to show cause were issued on 
January 7, 1991. Their case was decided by the Boar d 
September 14, 1999, well after the transition rules took 
effect. Although the Pinhos satisfied the continuous 
physical presence test as of the date they applied for 
suspension of deportation, the Board held that the law to 
be applied was the one in effect at the time of its review 
because the Act said it was to apply to pending cases. Since 
the Pinhos could not demonstrate physical pr esence of 
seven years in the United States from the time of their 
entry until the time that the order to show cause was 
served on them, they do not meet a threshold r equirement 
for suspension of deportation and therefor e are ineligible to 
be considered for this discretionary r elief. 
 
Six other circuits have addressed the applicability of the 
stop-time rule to pending deportation proceedings, and 
each has held that the stop-time rule applies to all pending 
cases in which a final administrative decision had not been 
rendered by the enactment of the Refor m and 
Responsibility Act. See Afolayan v. INS, 219 F.3d 784, 788 
(8th Cir. 2000); Gonzalez-Torr es v. INS, 213 F.3d 899, 903 
(5th Cir. 2000); Rivera-Jimenez v. INS , 214 F.3d 1213, 1217 
(10th Cir. 2000); Appiah v. INS, 202 F.3d 704, 708-09 (4th 
Cir. 2000); Tefel v. Reno, 180 F.3d 1286, 1288-90 (11th Cir. 
1999), cert. denied 120 S.Ct. 2657 (2000); Arrozal v. INS, 
159 F.3d 429, 434-35 (9th Cir. 1998). The decision of the 
Board constitutes the final administrative decision. 
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Therefore, as a matter of statutory law, the Board properly 
applied the new stop-time rule to the Pinhos' applications. 
 
The Board's application of the stop-time rule to the 
Pinhos' case does not constitute an unconstitutional 
retroactive application of law. "A statute does not operate 
`retrospectively' merely because it . . . upsets expectations 
based in prior law." Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 269. "When the 
intervening statute authorizes or affects the propriety of 
prospective relief, application of the new provision is not 
retroactive." Id. at 273. 
 
Suspension of deportation is prospective r elief because it 
does not impair any vested rights. See T efel, 180 F.3d at 
1302. Since the relief had not yet been granted and was 
discretionary even if the alien met all eligibility criteria, the 
change in eligibility criteria did not overtur n a final 
administrative decision or impair vested rights. At most, the 
Pinhos merely had an expectation of receiving the relief 
requested, not a right to it. The Pinhos had no preexisting 
legal right to remain in the United States, as they had 
already been adjudged deportable. Since no vested rights 
were affected in this case, no potential violation of due 
process exists. See Gonzalez-Torres, 213 F.3d at 903; Tefel, 
180 F.3d at 1302. 
 
The Pinhos argue that the Board's decision deprives them 
of more than discretionary relief which has not yet been 
granted because it deprives them of "their home, their 
family unit, their business and community support and the 
ties which they have established over the past fifteen 
years." The adjudication of their deportability established 
that they had no legal right to remain in this country. It 
was that determination, not the failur e to grant 
discretionary relief afterward, that cut off their rights to 
remain in the United States. Since the Pinhos conceded 
deportability, their status as deportable aliens is not before 
this Court. 
 
The United States did not officially or systematically 
encourage the Pinhos to remain in this country or to 
pursue suspension of deportation in lieu of another means 
of acquiring lawful residency in the United States. On the 
contrary, the Pinhos overstayed their non-immigrant visas, 
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chose to establish residency, and started a business in this 
country without obtaining authorization to be in the United 
States. They also returned to the United States without 
valid authorization after having been refused immigrant 
visas. If the Government had induced the Pinhos to waive 
their rights to contest deportability or had singled out their 
application for delayed review until after the stop-time rule 
went into effect, then a different analysis might be 
appropriate.5 There is no evidence that anything out of the 
ordinary occurred in this case. The Pinhos are deportable 
because they entered the United States illegally. At the time 
their application for the discretionary r elief of suspension of 
deportation was reviewed by the Board, they did not qualify 
for any special exception from the generally applicable 
immigration laws. 
 
The due process considerations of "fair notice, reasonable 
reliance, and settled expectations" ar e not implicated in this 
case. See Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 270. The Pinhos were not 
deprived of the opportunity to conform their conduct to the 
law. See id. at 265. The eligibility criteria for suspension of 
deportation review the circumstances in which an alien 
facing deportation is found, not any action taken by him. 
The Pinhos could not have undertaken any lawful action 
that would have changed their circumstances, allowing 
them to satisfy the continuous physical presence test. 
 
The application of the stop-time rule to pending cases is 
constitutional if it has a rational basis. See Appiah, 202 
F.3d at 710. We conclude that it does. Congress enacted 
this rule for the purpose of expediting the r emoval of 
deportable aliens, limiting discretionary r elief, and removing 
incentive to delay immigration proceedings. Gonzalez- 
Torres, 213 F.3d at 902; Appiah, 202 F.3d at 710. This was 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Circumstances such as these led to the exceptions for certain groups 
of aliens set out in NACARA. See also section II. B. of this opinion, 
infra. 
While we are troubled by the significant delay in the Board's action on 
the Pinhos' appeal, we cannot conclude that it amounts to inducement 
by the Government for the Pinhos to remain in this country or to forego 
any alternative course of action. We can only speculate as to whether a 
different result may have been achieved if the Board acted promptly and 
decided this case prior to the enactment of the Reform and 
Responsibility Act. 
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done as an integral part of an overall streamlining of the 
immigration process in order to impr ove efficiency in that 
process. See Gonzalez-Torres , 213 F.3d at 902. 
 
B. 
 
The Pinhos also challenge NACARA's system for pr oviding 
more lenient requirements for certain groups of aliens with 
respect to the continuous physical presence rules. Aliens 
from Nicaragua, Cuba, and certain other Central American 
and eastern European countries ar e not subject to the 
stop-time rule under the transitional rules. See  NACARA 
SS 202(b)(1), 203(a)(1); 8 U.S.C. S 1101 note (Supp. IV 
1998). 
 
It is well settled that the power to regulate the admission 
or removal of aliens is a "fundamental sover eign attribute 
exercised by the Government's political departments largely 
immune from judicial control." Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 
792 (1977) (quoting Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 
210 (1953)). Congress's differing tr eatment of certain 
classes of aliens is an aspect of that political power and 
involves the United States' relations with for eign powers. 
Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976). Accor dingly, we 
must afford such legislation great deference, applying a 
"narrow standard of review" and upholding the law if it has 
a rational basis. Id. at 82. 
 
NACARA's exceptions from the general stop-time rule for 
certain alien groups easily withstand this rational basis 
review. Since the application of the stop-time rule to 
pending cases itself does not violate due pr ocess, any 
exceptions to this rule that are carved out by Congress 
would be invalid only if the challenger "advanc[es] 
principled reasoning that will at once invalidate that 
[classification] and yet tolerate a dif ferent [classification] 
separating some aliens from others." 426 U.S. at 82. 
 
The United States specifically encouraged aliens who are 
members of the groups described in NACARA to seek 
asylum and to remain in the United States. These aliens 
were given work authorization, granted various special 
statuses to avoid deportation until their cases could be fully 
reviewed, and specifically encouraged to apply for 
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suspension of deportation, as that remedy existed. See 143 
Cong. Rec. S10,185, at 10197 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1997) 
(statement of Sen. Mack). The special exemptions fr om "the 
1996 retroactive immigration bill" for members of these 
"extremely identifiable groups," 143 Cong. Rec. S10185, at 
S10197 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1997) (statement of Sen. 
Graham), bears at least a rational relationship to the 
legitimate government interests of for eign relations, 
national security policy, and compliance with on-going 
government programs. 
 
The Pinhos are treated differ ently from groups of aliens 
who are granted special exceptions from the general 
immigration rules because they are not similarly situated to 
members of those groups. NACARA's exceptions ar e not 
arbitrary, but rather respond to particular government 
action directed specifically toward members of the groups 
who are granted the exceptions. Pursuant to its power to 
control immigration and respond to for eign relations and 
defense policy objectives, Congress passed the Reform and 
Responsibility Act, among other things, to limit 
discretionary relief from the generally applicable 
immigration laws. It further amended the immigration laws 
to provide for an exception for a readily identifiable, limited 
group of aliens who were subjects of on-going judicial and 
other government proceedings, including informal 
immigration proceedings. The exception was cr eated to 
prevent interference with settled expectations arising out of 
those proceedings. Therefore, we conclude that Congress 
acted well within its authority in enacting NACARA. 
 
Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the Board of 
Immigration Appeals. 
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